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ABSTRACT
Despite concerns on joint-provision of audit and non-audit services, not many studies 
have been conducted on examining the factors influencing companies to purchase non-
audit services from their auditor. The attachment theory postulates that non-audit services 
purchasing decisions are influenced by the director-auditor link. Using 759 sample 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia in 2007, the OLS regression results show a significant 
positive relationship between director-auditor link and non-audit services fee. The finding 
adds to the limited literature on the factors influencing companies to purchase non-audit 
services from their auditor and suggests the need for active involvement of shareholders 
in the auditor selection process.
Keywords: Attachment theory, auditor choice, auditor-auditee relationship, director-auditor link, interlocking 
directorships, non-audit services fee
INTRODUCTION
Joint provision of audit with non-audit 
services has received a considerable amount 
of attention due to the possible negative 
effects on auditor independence. It is argued 
that providing non-audit services to audit 
clients creates conflicts of self interest 
(Svanstrom & Sundgren, 2012) in the 
sense that an auditor might give in to client 
pressure to avoid jeopardising or losing 
lucrative non-audit services or be reluctant 
to adversely report on items involving 
non-audit services (Firth, 2002). However, 
despite these concerns, not many studies 
have been conducted on examining the 
factors influencing companies to purchase 
non-audit services from their auditors. 
The limited research may probably be due 
to the lack of data since many countries 
do not have any requirements regarding 
the disclosure of non-audit services. For 
example, listed companies in Malaysia 
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and the United States only required the 
disclosure of non-audit services in 2001. 
Thus, the primary purpose of this study is 
to examine the factors affecting the joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services 
focussing on the director-auditor link. The 
attachment theory postulates that purchasing 
decisions related to non-audit services are 
influenced by the director-auditor link.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Besides auditing services, accounting 
firms also provide some other services. 
Among them are accounting related 
consultancy, forensic accounting, taxation, 
management accounting, secretarial 
services, management information systems 
and internal controls. As has been contended 
by Chien and Chen (2005), audit firms 
need to provide non-audit services to gain 
various benefits, which, among others, are 
competitive advantages, personnel attraction 
and retention, meeting client’s needs and 
risk diversification. Non-audit services 
have become an issue in auditing due to 
the joint provision of audit with non-audit 
services. Even though joint provision could 
be beneficial in terms of cost saving through 
knowledge spillover (Barkess & Simnett, 
1994; Svanstrom & Sundgren, 2012), the 
possible effects on auditor independence 
have become a concern (see for example 
DeFond, Raghunandan & Subramanyam, 
2002; Hay, Knechel & Li, 2006; Quick & 
Warming-Rasmussen, 2009). In Malaysia, 
the government’s concerns on this matter 
have led to the imposition of a mandatory 
requirement for the disclosure and the 
prohibition of joint provision of audit with 
some types of non-audit services. The By-
laws (On Professional Ethics, Conduct and 
Practices) of the Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants (2010) have prohibited auditors 
from providing valuation services, litigation 
support services, dispute resolutions and 
some corporate finance services to their 
audit clients. For listed clients, the By-
laws also prohibit auditors from providing 
accounting and bookkeeping services, 
internal audit services, staff lending and 
design and financial information technology 
services.
Prior studies have identified three 
(3) factors that may affect the non-audit 
services fee. While many believe that 
companies with higher agency conflicts 
will demand higher audit quality (see for 
example DeFond, 1992; Firth & Smith, 
1992; Francis & Wilson, 1988), the level 
of agency conflict is postulated to be 
negatively related to non-audit fee. Firth 
(1997) hypothesised that higher agency 
conflict companies will purchase lesser 
non-audit services in order to protect an 
auditor’s independence (especially when it 
is perceived independence). In a study, Firth 
(1997), who used data from 500 of the largest 
British listed companies for the year 1993, 
found significant positive relationships 
between directors’ shareholdings and 
the largest owner’s shareholdings with 
non-audit services fee; Firth also found a 
significant negative relationship between 
leverage and non-audit services fee. In an 
earlier United States study by Parkash and 
Venable (1993), data from 860 observations 
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during the period from 1978 to 1980 were 
used, with similar evidence collected. 
Audit services fee is believed to have 
a negative relationship with non-audit fee. 
This belief is due to the possible ‘loss leader’ 
practised by auditors, where the auditor 
charges a lower price for audit services 
in order to attract the non-audit service 
work (Hay et al., 2006). Besides that, 
the use of an incumbent auditor may also 
increase the level of efficiency of the auditor 
due to knowledge-spillovers and hence, 
may save cost (Barkess & Simnett, 1994; 
Simunic, 1984). However, prior research has 
generally found a positive relationship (see 
for example Barkess & Simnett, 1994; Hay 
et al., 2006; Houghton & Jubb, 1999). Peel 
and Clatworthy (2001) had argued that the 
positive relationship may be due to the audit 
services fee being inflated at the expense 
of the non-audit services fee, where the 
portion of non-audit services fee is included 
as audit services fee. Meanwhile, Firth 
(2002) posits that the positive relationship 
as due to the demand for non-audit services 
because of certain company specific events 
and the occurrence of these events may 
lead to higher audit efforts (thus increases 
the amount of audit services fee). Firth 
(1997) had suggested that the cost-saving 
of knowledge-spillover (if it exists), may be 
kept by the auditor if competition for audit 
and non-audit services is limited. 
It has also been hypothesised that the 
type of audit opinion has an effect on the 
amount of non-audit services fee charged 
by the auditor. While audit production costs 
and audit risks are likely to be higher for 
auditors who issue qualified audit opinions 
(Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; Simunic, 
1980), Houghton and Jubb (1999) argue 
that an audit qualification could increase the 
amount of non-audit services fee charged 
due to the audit services fee recoup strategy 
by the auditor. They add that the additional 
costs borne by the auditors by their decision 
to issue an audit qualification are not 
necessarily recouped through the audit 
services fee alone but also through the non-
audit services fee (where an incumbent 
auditor also provides non-audit services to 
the client). The auditors may make use of 
non-audit services as a means of relieving 
billing constraints for audit services since 
the non-audit services fee is less price-
sensitive and less constrained to increase 
(Houghton & Jubb, 1999). Prior studies by 
DeFond et al. (2002) and Houghton and 
Jubb (1999) have both found support for 
these arguments. 
HYPOTHESES
Past studies have shown that interlocking 
directors have the tendency to select the 
same auditor across the companies in which 
they serve. This may be due to the fact that 
these directors may have developed an 
attachment with a particular auditor with 
whom they have previously worked. The 
evidence of these occurrences (termed as 
director-auditor link) have been shown by 
Davison, Stening and Wai. (1984) and Jubb 
and Houghton (1998) in Australia and Malek 
and Che Ahmad (2011) in Malaysia. 
The strength of interpersonal and inter-
organisational attachment is expected to 
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grow when relationship-specific skills are 
necessary to adequately perform the tasks 
required (Meyer, Rigsby & Boone, 2007). 
Such assets may consist of well-grounded 
communication patterns and the development 
of trust among those individuals involved 
in boundary-spanning roles; knowledge 
of the peculiarities of a firm’s accounting 
system; and understanding of the client’s 
product market to forecast the likely value of 
inventory (Levinthal & Fichman, 1982). For 
example, when specialised knowledge or 
skill-sets are needed, which may be specific 
to a particular organisation, then, significant 
investment is required at the personal and 
the organisational level in the relationship 
(Meyer et al., 2007). One immediate benefit 
of continuing a relationship is a substantial 
saving in time and effort for both the client 
and auditor in familiarising the auditor 
with the client’s accounting procedures 
(Levinthal & Fichman, 1982). 
Most of the non-audit services provide 
beneficial and important inputs to directors 
(which will then be used by the directors 
in the decision-making process), hence, 
besides emphasising upon the quality of 
the services itself, directors also require 
that the providers of these services are 
those whom they can personally trust. The 
familiarisation of the quality of work of 
auditors (through experience working in 
the interlink companies) and mutual trust 
between interlink directors and interlink 
auditor will result in the interlink directors 
being more favourable towards an interlink 
auditor in the appointment for the providers 
of the non-audit services.
From the auditor’s perspective, interlink 
auditors may also use their influence power 
(which exists due to mutual dependence and 
mutual trust) upon the interlink directors 
to purchase additional services from them. 
In a profession in which clients are loyal 
to their existing relationships, networking 
offers one of the best ways of finding leads 
for new business opportunities (Harding, 
1996). This suggests that the attachment 
created by the director-auditor link may lead 
to the existence of opportunities for new 
businesses (which, in this case, is providing 
non-audit services) for the auditor. 
Therefore, it is argued that director-
auditor links are related to non-audit fees, 
hence, leading to the following hypothesis:
H1: The director-auditor link is significantly 
and positively related to the non-audit 
services fee.
In order to capture the possible different 
influence by different types of director, the 
following hypotheses are tested:
H1a: The director-auditor link generated 
by executive interlocking directors is 
significantly and positively related to 
the non-audit services fee.
H1b: The director-auditor link generated by 
non-executive interlocking directors is 
significantly and positively related to 
the non-audit services fee.
H1b1: The director-auditor link generated 
by independent  non-execut ive 
interlocking directors is significantly 
and positively related to the non-audit 
services fee.
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METHODOLOGY
The initial population of this study was all 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia 
Main Board and Second Board in the year 
2007, totalling 863 companies. A total of 
104 companies (23 newly-listed companies, 
39 financial companies, 8 financial year-
end-change companies and 34 incomplete 
information companies) were excluded from 
the sample, which brings the final sample to 
a total of 759 companies.
For the testing of hypotheses H1 ‒ H1b1, 
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) non-audit 
services fee model is used and is replicated 
and modified from Firth (1997) and Parkash 
and Venable (1993). The model takes the 
following form:
LNAS
= β0 + β1DIRLINK + β2LAFEE  
+ β3OPINION + β4ET_CC  
+ β5ET_FC + β6BFOUR  
+ β7LASSET + β8LSUBS  
+ β9INVREC + β10LEV + β11ROE  
+ β12DIROWN + β13INITIAL  
+ β14BOARD + β15INSTHLDG  
+ β16ISSUE + β17GROWTH  
+ β18RESTATE + β19LgOWN  
+ β20LAGE + β21DLOSS  
+ β22LAGOPINION + β23QUICK 
+ µ
LNAS is measured by natural logarithm 
of total non-audit services fee paid by the 
company to its auditor. Consistent with 
Courtney and Jubb (2002) and Jubb and 
Houghton (1998), the director-auditor link 
is measured by the number of interlocking 
companies (companies in which the 
directors of the observed company also 
served as directors) audited by the focal 
company’s auditor. H1 is measured by the 
number of interlocking companies generated 
by all directors of the focal company 
audited by the observation company’s 
auditor. H1a is measured by the number 
of interlocking companies generated by 
executive directors of the focal company 
audited by the observation company’s 
auditor, H1b1 is measured by the number of 
interlocking companies generated by non-
executive directors of the focal company 
audited by the observation company’s 
auditor and H1b2 is measured by the number 
of interlocking companies generated by 
executive directors of the focal company 
audited by the observation company’s 
auditor. Other variables are measured as 
follows: 
LAFEE = Natural logarithm of audit 
services fee
OPINION = 1, unqualified audit 
opinion 0, otherwise
ET_CC = Proportion of Chinese 
directors
ET_FC = Proportion of foreign 
directors
BFOUR = 1, brand name auditor 0, 
otherwise 
LASSET = Natural logarithm of total 
assets 
LSUBS = Natural logarithm of 
number of subsidiaries 
INVREC = Proportion of inventory 
and receivables to total assets 
LEV = Ratio of long-term debt to total 
equity
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ROE = Proportion of net profit to total 
shareholders’ equity 
DIROWN = Percentage of directors’ 
shareholdings 
INITIAL = 1, newly appointed auditor 
0, otherwise
BOARD = 1, main board companies 
0, otherwise
INSTHLDG = Percentage of shares 
owned by institutional holdings 
ISSUE = 1, acquired additional 
funding 0, otherwise
GROWTH = Sales growth over last 
fiscal year
RESTATE = 1, restatement of prior 
year audit account 0, otherwise
LgOWN = Percentage of shares 
owned by the largest shareholder
LAGE = Natural logarithm of number 
of years listed 
DLOSS = 1, loss in prior and current 
year 0, otherwise 
LAGOPINION = 1, unqualified audit 
opinion in prior year 0, otherwise
QUICK = Ratio of current asset (less 
inventory) to current liabilities 
RESULTS
Descriptive and Univariate Analysis 
Results
Table 1 and Table 2 below present the 
descriptive statistics and univariate test 
results for samples of companies based 
on companies which purchase non-audit 
services from its auditor (purchaser 
companies) and companies which do not 
purchase non-audit services from its auditor 
(non-purchaser companies).
Table 1 shows that purchaser companies 
have twice the number of director-auditor 
links than non-purchaser companies and 
the results of the t-test of mean differences 
between the two groups are significant 
(at a 1 % significance level) for all the 
hypotheses variables. On average, the 
purchaser companies’ auditors audit 1.77 
of interlocking companies, while non-
purchaser companies’ auditors only audit 
0.88 of interlocking companies. Based on 
types of interlocking director, the purchaser 
companies’ auditors audit 0.45 of executive 
directors’ interlocking companies, 1.56 
of non-executive directors’ interlocking 
companies and 1.08 of independent directors’ 
interlocking companies, while non-purchaser 
companies’ auditors only audit 0.20 of 
executive directors’ interlocking companies, 
0.78 of non-executive directors’ interlocking 
companies and 0.61 of independent directors’ 
interlocking companies. 
Meanwhile, Table 2 shows significant 
frequency differences of the interlink 
auditor between purchaser and non-
purchaser companies (at a 1 % significance 
level). While a majority of non-purchaser 
companies are audited by non-interlink 
auditors, a majority of purchaser companies 
are audited by interlink-auditors (60 %) 
and interlink auditors from non-executive 
interlocking directors (56 %). In addition, 
49 % of purchaser companies are audited 
by interlink auditors from independent 
interlocking directors and 25 % are audited 
by interlink auditors from executive 
interlocking directors.
Table 3 presents a matrix of the 
Pearson-Correlation for all the variables. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test Results of Continuous Variables for Purchasers and Non-
Purchasers of Non-Audit Services
Variable
Purchaser of NAS  
(Sample= 428 )
Non-Purchaser of NAS  
(Sample= 331 )
t-test 
(2 tailed)
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
DIRLINK 1.77 2.26 0.88 1.45 -6.556*
EDLINK 0.45 0.94 0.20 0.56 -4.625*
NDLINK 1.56 2.09 0.78 1.34 -6.229*
INDLINK 1.08 1.57 0.61 1.12 -4.851*
LAFEE 5.17 0.44 5.08 0.37 -3.267*
ET_CC 0.54 0.31 0.6 0.27 2.688*
ET_FC 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.143
LASSET 8.7 0.65 8.45 0.5 -5.884*
LSUBS 1.14 0.47 1.1 0.38 -1.267
INVREC 0.28 0.19 0.32 0.19 2.781*
LEV 0.29 0.94 0.23 0.34 -1.096
ROE 0.13 0.77 -0.01 1.15 -1.83
DIROWN 33.9 25.81 37.61 23.13 2.059*
LDELAY 1.97 0.13 2.01 0.12 3.644*
INSTHLDG 56.27 25.75 46.86 25.5 -5.021*
GROWTH 0.21 0.66 0.24 1.03 0.431
LGOWN 30.16 16.72 27.11 16.37 -2.517#
LAGE 1.04 0.38 0.95 0.35 -3.167*
QUICK 2.35 3.44 3 22.15 0.532
*Significant at 1 % level 
#Significant at 5 % level
The variables representing director-auditor 
links (DIRLINK, EDLINK, NDLINK and 
INDLINK) are all found to be significant 
and positively correlated with LNAS. LNAS 
is also found significant and positively 
correlated with variables such as LAFEE, 
ET_BC, BFOUR, LASSET, LSUBS, LEV, 
ROE, BOARD, INSTHLDG, RESTATE, 
LGOWN,  LAGE and  QUICK bu t 
significantly and negatively correlated with 
ET_CC, INVREC, DIROWN, LDELAY 
and DLOSS. Meanwhile, as expected, the 
correlations among the hypotheses variables 
are significant and considerably high. Thus, 
this supports the inclusion of the hypotheses 
variables separately, one after the other 
into the multivariate regressions. Among 
the independent variables, the correlations 
are found to be less than 0.5, except for 
correlations between LASSET with LSUBS, 
LASSET with BOARD and LGOWN with 
INSTHLDG.
Multivariate Analysis Result
Table 4 presents the results of OLS 
regressions. All models are significant at 
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a 1 % significance level. However, the 
adjusted R-squared of around 0.14 is lower 
than previous studies by Firth (1997) of 0.32 
and Parkash and Venable (1993) of 0.26. 
This implies that around 14 % of variation 
in non-audit services fee is explained by 
the model. 
The results show the significant and 
positive coefficient of DIRLINK at a 1 
% significance level which implies that 
the greater the director-auditor link, the 
higher the audit services fee. Meanwhile, 
the coefficient for variables EDLINK and 
NDLINK are positive and significant at a 5 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test Results of Dummy Variables for Purchasers and Non-Purchasers 
of Non-Audit Services Companies
Variable NAS Purchaser(Sample = 428)
Non- Purchaser
(Sample = 331)
Pearson chi-
square test
OPINION Unqualified Other 
294 (88.82%)
37 (11.18%)
374 (87.38%)
54 (12.62%) 0.3661
BFOUR Big 4Non-Big 4 
258 (77.95%)
73 (22.05%)
237 (55.37%)
191 (44.63%) 41.922*
INITIAL ChangeNon-Change 
14 (4.23%)
317 (95.77)
28 (6.54%)
400 (93.46%) 1.909
BOARD MainSecond
269 (81.27%)
62 (18.73%)
280 (65.42%)
148 (34.58%) 23.426*
ISSUE IssueNon-Issuance
52 (15.71%)
279 (84.29%)
65 (15.19%)
363 (84.81%) 0.0392
FISDEC DecemberOthers
178 (53.78%)
153 (46.22%)
250 (58.41%)
178 (41.59%) 1.630
RESTATE RestateNone
161 (48.64%)
170 (51.36%)
149 (34.81%)
279 (65.19%) 14.770*
FOREIGN WithWithout
185 (55.89%)
146 (44.11%)
251 (58.64%)
177 (41.36%) 0.5789
DLOSS LossNone
36 (10.88%)
295 (89.12%)
77 (17.99%)
351 (82.01%) 7.456*
LAGOPINION Unqualified Others
306 (92.45%)
25 (7.55%)
395 (92.29%)
33 (7.71%) 0.0066
Director
-Auditor Link
DIRLINK
Others
198 (59.82%)
133 (40.18%)
181 (42.29%)
247 (57.71%) 22.941*
EDLINK
Others
84 (25.38%)
247 (74.62%)
62 (14.49%)
366 (85.51%) 14.252*
NDLINK
Others
186 (56.19%)
145 (43.81%)
166 (38.79%)
262 (61.21%) 22.745*
INDLINK
Others
162 (48.94%)
169 (51.06%)
141 (32.94%)
287 (67.06%) 19.919*
*Asymptotic Significance at 1 % level (two-tailed) 
# Asymptotic Significance at 5 % level (two-tailed)
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% significance level but the coefficient for 
variable INDLINK is insignificant. These 
results imply that the director-auditor link 
created by executive and non-executive 
directors have an influence on the non-audit 
services fee while the director-auditor link 
created by independent directors do not 
have an influence on non-audit services fee. 
Overall, the results support the hypotheses 
that the greater the director-auditor link, the 
higher the non-audit services fee. Therefore, 
the results confirm the prediction of the 
preferences of Malaysian companies for 
interlink auditors in non-audit services 
fee decisions as a result of attachments 
developed through director-auditor links. 
The attachments created by director-auditor 
links develop trust regarding the quality of 
services provided by interlink auditors and 
at the same time, gives an opportunity for 
interlink auditors to influence the interlink 
director to purchase additional services 
from them. For the control variables, 
BFOUR, LASSET and RESTATE are 
found to be positively significant across all 
the regressions at a 1 %significance level, 
which is consistent with earlier studies by 
Firth (1997), Houghton and Jubb (1999) and 
Parkash and Venable (1993).
TABLE 4 
Results of OLS Regression of Non-Audit Services Fee
Variable PredictedSign
OLS Regression
Panel A
Coefficient
(t-value)
Panel B
Coefficient
(t-value)
Panel C
Coefficient
(t-value)
Panel D
Coefficient
(t-value)
Constant -4.121##          (-2.31)
-4.078##
(-2.28)
-4.035##          
(-2.25)
-3.999##
(-2.23)
DIRLINK + 0.717*(2.47) - - -
EDLINK + - 0.912**(1.91) - -
NDLINK + - - 0.589**(1.91) -
INDLINK + - - - 0.466(1.37)
LAFEE +/- -0.420         (-0.99)
-0.460
(-1.08)
-0.431         
(-1.01)
-0.478
(-1.12)
OPINION - -0.085(-0.28)
-0.038
(-0.12)
-0.086
(-0.28)
-0.056
(-0.18)
ET_CC +/- -0.434(-1.34)
-0.443
(-1.36)
-0.429
(-1.32)
-0.458
(-1.41)
ET_FC +/- -0.191(-1.63)
-1.211**
(-1.65)
-0.1214**
(-1.66)
-1.260**
(-1.72)
BFOUR + 0.765*(4.05)
0.872*
(4.84)
0.814*
(4.36)
0.853*
(4.61)
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Variable PredictedSign
OLS Regression
Panel A
Coefficient
(t-value)
Panel B
Coefficient
(t-value)
Panel C
Coefficient
(t-value)
Panel D
Coefficient
(t-value)
LSUBS + -0.165  (-0.52)
-0.130
(-0.41)
-0.149  
(-0.47)
-0.119
(-0.37)
INVREC + 0.115(0.25)
0.121
(0.26)
0.099
(0.21)
0.096
(0.21)
LEV - 0.100(0.81)
0.086
(0.70)
0.102
(0.82)
0.098
(0.79)
ROE - 0.063(0.80)
0.065
(0.81)
0.061
(0.77)
0.061
(0.76)
DIROWN + -0.005        (-1.53)
-0.005
(-1.55)
-0.005        
(-1.53)
-0.005
(-1.51)
INITIAL - -0.161(-0.46)
-0.163
(-0.47)
-0.177
(-0.51)
-0.170
(-0.49)
BOARD - 0.162(0.77)
0.162
(0.77)
0.162
(0.77)
0.168
(0.79)
INSTHLDG + 0.005      (1.21)
0.006
(1.31)
0.005  
(1.22)
0.005
(1.24)
ISSUE + 0.171(0.76)
0.156
(0.69)
0.175    
 (0.78)
0.179
(0.79)
GROWTH + -0.073(-0.81)
-0.079
(-0.88)
-0.068
(-0.76)
-0.066
(-0.74)
RESTATE + 0.401*   (2.46)
0.405*
(2.48)
0.425* 
(2.62)
0.431*
(2.65)
LGOWN - -0.004        (-0.57)
-0.004
(-0.57)
-0.004        
(-0.61)
-0.004
(-0.58)
LAGE - 0.158   (0.66)
0.119
(0.50)
0.164 
(0.69)
0.168
(0.70)
DLOSS + -0.193        (-0.80)
-0.193
(-0.80)
-0.202        
(-0.83)
-0.196
(-0.81)
LAGOPINION - 0.022(0.06)
-0.018
(-0.05)
0.005
(0.01)
-0.038
(-0.10)
QUICK +/- -0.003(-0.69)
-0.004
(-0.73)
-0.003
(-0.70)
-0.003
(-0.71)
Adj-R² 0.1414# 0.1386# 0.1386# 0.1365#
*Significant at 1 % level (one-tailed) 
**Significant at 5 % level (one-tailed) 
# Significant at 1 % (two-tailed)
TABLE 4 (continue)
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CONCLUSION 
Using the data of 759 listed companies 
on Bursa Malaysia in 2007, this study has 
shown the effect of the director-auditor link 
on non-audit services fee. Consistent with 
the initial prediction, the results of the OLS 
regression show that the director-auditor 
link has significant positive effects on non-
audit services fee paid to the auditor. In 
addition, the OLS regression results also 
show that the director-auditor link created 
by executive and non-executive directors 
have influence on non-audit services fee 
while the director-auditor link created 
by independent directors do not have an 
influence on non-audit services fee. Overall, 
the results confirm the prediction of the 
preference of companies for their interlink 
auditor in non-audit services decisions as a 
result of the attachments developed by the 
director-auditor link. The findings support 
the influence of attachments created by 
the director-auditor link on auditing in 
Malaysia. While the joint provision of 
audit and non-audit services are usually 
linked to the impairment of the auditor’s 
independence, the findings suggest the need 
for active involvement of shareholders in the 
auditor selection process.
Despite the concerns of impairment 
on auditor's independence from providing 
additional services to audit clients, not 
many studies have been conducted in 
understanding the factors influencing 
companies' decision to purchase additional 
services from their auditors. In particular, 
this study adds to the growing literature on 
the influence of interlocking directorships 
(especially the director-auditor link) and 
the factors influencing joint provision of 
audit and non-audit services. For future 
studies, it is suggested to consider corporate 
governance as one possible factor in 
influencing non-audit fees and to separate 
the data of non-audit fees into different 
categories.
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